In article <%yKc7.email@example.com>,
Earl Cox <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>I suppose the statements:
>>The important distinction is not
>> between bivalent logic and multivalent logic, but between
>> meta-language and object language. A bivalent logic in the
>> meta-language is perfectly adequate for the purpose of modeling the
>> fuzziness in the object language.
>must make sense to someone. But any metalanguage
>that can convert two-valued logic into continuous valued
>logic must be, at heart, fuzzy logic (since this is exactly
>what fuzzy logic, via the extension Principle, does.)
I repeat, nobody has been able to make anything sensible
in the form of a linear continuous truth-value system.
Probability is not a truth-value system, but a scale
resting on a Boolean one.
In any truth-value system, the truth of a statement made
by combining other statements with logical operators
depends only on the truth-values and the operators. The
truth-value of A OR B depends ONLY on those of A and B.
If A has truth-value 1/2, and B has truth-value 1/2, the
truth-value of A OR B is the same if B=A or if B = ~A.
Probability is NOT truth-value, and does not try to be.
Fuzziness tries to be.
-- This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University. Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399 email@example.com Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
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